KessinenandEsa Kataja
71e413fbbb
Authelia now runs in front of Traefik, so the app was asking for a second
password at the same door. This removes its own authentication entirely
rather than layering the two.
## Breaking — the server needs both files in this deploy
`compose.yaml` and `.env` are not pulled from this repository. The new image
ignores `PASSWORD`, and the old image refuses to start without it, so the
image and the compose file have to move together or the container dies at
startup.
| Variable | Change |
|---|---|
| `PASSWORD` | **removed** — the app no longer reads it |
| `AUTH` | **new, required** — the Traefik middleware that authenticates the app, e.g. `authelia@docker` |
| `CERTRESOLVER` | **new, required** — the resolver issuing the certificate for `HOST` |
The `tls=true` label is replaced by `tls.certresolver=${CERTRESOLVER}`.
Naming a resolver implies TLS, so it stays one label rather than two — and
the resolver had been carried by hand on the server since the first deploy.
## What was removed
- `auth()` and `challenge()` — HTTP Basic over a single shared password
- `throttle.go` and its tests — the per-IP guess limiter and the
`X-Forwarded-For` handling that fed it
- `golang.org/x/time`, which existed only for that limiter
- Sixty `-u` flags from the smoke script
`routes()` returns the bare mux and `/healthz` is an ordinary route on it.
159 insertions against 446 deletions; nothing was written to replace what
went.
## What holds the app up now
Both invariants live in `compose.yaml`, next to comments saying why:
- **The router names the Authelia middleware through `AUTH`.** Traefik takes
a router out of service when its middleware does not resolve, so an unset
or misspelt value fails shut rather than serving the app open.
- **The container publishes no ports.** It is reachable only over the shared
proxy network. Publishing `8080` would now bypass authentication outright,
not merely TLS.
`/healthz` returns the version and nothing else, so it is safe to exempt in
Authelia if a monitor needs to reach it.
## Why this is stronger, not weaker
The layer being deleted was one shared secret with no sessions, no second
factor and no way to revoke access for one person. Authelia does all three,
configured once for every service on the host instead of reimplemented per
app. The weaker of the two prompts was the one being kept.
## Tests
`TestAuth` and `TestHealthzSkipsAuth` are replaced by a single test asserting
every route answers without credentials — a 401 from the app would now mean
authentication had crept back in. `make check` green; CI green on `dev`.
## Note on the commit list
Nine of the ten commits below are already in `main` via #4, squash-merged
under a different SHA. They contribute nothing to the diff, which is the
auth removal alone.
---------
Co-authored-by: Esa Kataja <[email protected]>
Reviewed-on: #5