BREAKING CHANGE: PASSWORD is gone and AUTH and CERTRESOLVER are required.
The server's compose.yaml and .env must be updated in the same deploy — the
new image ignores PASSWORD, and the old one refuses to start without it.
Authelia now sits in front of Traefik, so the app was asking for a second
password at the same door. Two prompts, and the weaker of the two was the one
holding a single shared secret with no sessions, no MFA and no revocation.
Deleting it is the whole change: Authelia already does this properly, once,
for every service on the host.
Gone: auth(), challenge(), the whole of throttle.go and its tests, and
golang.org/x/time with them. routes() returns the bare mux, /healthz is an
ordinary route on it, and the smoke script drops sixty -u flags. Roughly 230
lines removed and nothing written to replace them.
What holds the app up now, both asserted in compose.yaml:
- The router names the Authelia middleware through AUTH. Traefik takes a
router out of service when its middleware does not resolve, so a typo or an
unset variable fails shut rather than serving the app open.
- The container still publishes no ports, so the proxy is the only thing that
can reach it. Publishing 8080 would now bypass authentication outright, not
merely TLS — the comment there says so.
certresolver replaces the bare tls=true, parameterised as CERTRESOLVER: the
server had been carrying that label by hand since the first deploy. Naming a
resolver implies tls=true, so it stays one label.
TestAuth and TestHealthzSkipsAuth are replaced by one test asserting every
route answers without credentials — a 401 from here would now mean auth had
crept back in.
The deployment is a public hostname behind Traefik rather than a LAN-only
box, which changes two things.
TLS is now terminated by the proxy, so Basic credentials are no longer in
cleartext. The container publishes no ports: doing so would leave an
unencrypted copy of the app on the host, bypassing the proxy. The hostname
lives in .env rather than compose.yaml, so no infrastructure detail is
committed and the MIT publication option stays open.
The password is now the only thing between the internet and the app, and a
500 ms sleep is not a defence at that exposure. Wrong guesses are rate
limited per client address: five in a burst, then one per ten seconds,
answered with 429.
Two details that decide whether this works at all:
- a request with no Authorization header is not charged. That is the
handshake every browser session opens with, and counting it would lock the
household out for simply opening the app a few times.
- X-Forwarded-For is believed only when the connection arrived from a private
address, i.e. through the proxy, and then only its last entry, which is the
one the proxy observed. A direct client could otherwise forge a fresh
address per attempt and walk past the limiter entirely.
None of this substitutes for a strong password. It removes brute force as a
practical route, nothing more. PRD §3, §9 and §10 are updated: "no external
internet exposure" is no longer true.
Bring up the stage 1 skeleton described in the PRD, enough that the app
builds, serves, and can be populated with dishes.
- net/http server with shared-password Basic auth, /healthz outside it,
graceful shutdown, and TZ-aware calendar days
- SQLite via modernc (pure Go, static binary), opened with WAL and a single
connection
- migration runner: numbered SQL files embedded and applied once each inside
a transaction, recorded in schema_migrations
- bundle import (PRD §7.3) as a live feature on the Ruoat tab: paste JSON or
upload a file, get a per-row Finnish report. The same importer is reachable
as `foodster -import` for repopulating a scratch database
- templ views and hand-written CSS with light-dark() theming; the Datastar
v1.0.3 client is vendored, since the Go SDK ships no browser asset and a
CDN would break an offline LAN
Names are normalized to sentence case rather than title case: Finnish
capitalizes only the first word of a phrase, so "Keitetyt perunat" is right
and "Keitetyt Perunat" is not. PRD §6 and §7.3 are amended to match.
Testing is behind make targets rather than ad-hoc commands: `make check` runs
lint, unit tests and scripts/smoke.sh, which exercises auth, static assets
and every import path against a scratch database on a spare port.
Esa Kataja